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The Strategic Formation of Multi-Layer Networks
Ebrahim Moradi Shahrivar and Shreyas Sundaram
Abstract
We study the strategic formation of multi-layer networks, where each layer represents a different type of
relationship between the nodes in the network and is designed to maximize some utility that depends on the
topology of that layer and those of the other layers. We start by generalizing distance-based network formation to
the two-layer setting, where edges are constructed in one layer (with fixed cost per edge) to minimize distances
between nodes that are neighbors in another layer. We show that designing an optimal network in this setting
is NP-hard. Despite the underlying complexity of the problem, we characterize certain properties of the optimal
networks. We then formulate a multi-layer network formation game where each layer corresponds to a player that
is optimally choosing its edge set in response to the edge sets of the other players. We consider utility functions
that view the different layers as strategic substitutes. By applying our results about optimal networks, we show that
players with low edge costs drive players with high edge costs out of the game, and that hub-and-spoke networks
that are commonly observed in transportation systems arise as Nash equilibria in this game.
Index Terms
Multi-layer Network Formation, NP-hardness, Best Response Network, Game Theory, Nash Equilibrium, Trans-
portation Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Examples of complex networks abound in both the natural world (e.g., ecological, social and economic systems),
and in engineered applications (e.g., the Internet, the power grid, etc.). The topological structure of such networks
(i.e., the relationships and interactions between the various nodes) plays a fundamental role in the functioning of the
network. Early research on the structure of complex networks primarily adopted a stochastic perspective, postulating
that the links between nodes are formed randomly [2], [3]. An alternative perspective, driven by the economics,
computer science and engineering communities, has argued that optimization (rather than pure randomness) plays a
key role in network formation. In such settings, edges are formed strategically (either by a designer or by the nodes
themselves) in order to maximize certain utility functions, resulting in networks that can be analyzed using game-
theoretic notions of equilibria and efficiency [4]–[7]. A particularly well-studied utility function is the so-called
distance-based utility introduced in [8], [9], where the objective is to purchase edges to minimize the distances
between all pairs of nodes in the network. Subsequent works on strategic network formation have looked at issues
such as individual decision making, price of anarchy, and directed network formation [10]–[13].
While the existing literature on strategic network formation focuses predominantly on the construction of a single
set of edges between the nodes, many real-world networks inherently consist of multiple layers of relationships
between the same set of nodes. Examples include friendship and professional relationships in social networks,
policy influence and knowledge exchange in organizational networks [14], and coupled communication and energy
infrastructure networks [15], [16]. While there has been growing research on different aspects of multi-layer networks
in recent years [14], [17]–[21], the problem of strategic multi-layer network formation has started to receive attention
only recently; aside from our initial work in [1], the paper [22] considers a model where each node can construct
edges to a second high-speed network in order to minimize communication costs.
Here, we begin a study of strategic multi-layer network formation by generalizing distance-utility network
formation to the case where one layer (or network) is formed by optimizing the distances between nodes that
are neighbors in another layer (or network). As a motivating example, consider the problem in [23], where both the
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2physical infrastructure network and the traffic flow network between a group of cities are studied. Interpreting traffic
flow as the weight of the connection between the endpoint cities, the objective is to design an optimal infrastructure
network between cities with respect to the given traffic flow pattern. In the simplest case, this problem can be
modeled as a network formation problem with a distance-based utility function where only the distances between
specific pairs of nodes matter (i.e., those pairs with sufficiently high traffic flow between them). We address this
class of problems by first defining a network G1 capturing an existing set of relationships between nodes, and then
studying the formation of an optimal second network G2 based on G1. We call the optimally designed network G2
with respect to G1 the best response network to G1. Distance-based utilities have also been used to study social
networks (where each node is an individual and the edges indicate relationships) [8], [9] and the Internet (where
each node represents a router and the edges indicate communication links) [10]. Our formulation generalizes the
settings presented in those papers by allowing only distances between certain pairs of nodes (e.g., individuals in the
social network or routers in the Internet) to matter when evaluating the utility of the network. For instance, in the
case of the Internet or other communication networks, the reference layer G1 represents the virtual communication
network indicating which pairs of nodes wish to exchange information, and the designed layer G2 represents the
physical communication network.
While the best response networks have been completely characterized in the case where G1 is the complete
network [8], [9], we show in this paper that finding a best response network with respect to an arbitrary graph G1
is NP-hard. We characterize some useful properties of the optimal networks that arise in this setting, including upper
bounds on the number of constructed edges, lower and upper bounds on the utility of the best response networks,
and conditions for the empty network to be a best response. These properties enable us to find best response
networks with respect to certain specific reference networks, i.e., forests and networks with a star subgraph.
We then use the notion of the best response network to model a scenario with multiple network designers,
each of whom is building a different layer of the network. An example of this is when multiple transportation
companies build their individual service networks among a group of cities, and each company prefers to provide
service between pairs of cities that are not already covered by other companies. We capture these scenarios by
defining a non-cooperative multi-layer network formation game where each player corresponds to a specific layer of
the network. We develop a notion of distance-based multi-layer network formation based on strategic substitutes,
where the presence of an edge in one layer makes it less desirable to have that edge in another layer. Despite
the complexity of calculating best response networks, we characterize the Nash equilibrium networks that arise
in this setting. In particular, we show that players with low costs for building edges drive out players that have
relatively high costs, and that our framework gives rise to the “hub-and-spoke” networks commonly seen in various
transportation systems [24].
II. DEFINITIONS
An undirected network (or graph) is denoted by G = (N,E) where N = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} is the set of nodes
(or vertices) and E ⊆ {(vi, vj)|vi, vj ∈ N, vi 6= vj}. The set of all possible graphs on N is denoted by GN . Two
nodes are said to be neighbors if there is an edge between them. The degree of a node vi ∈ N is the number of
its neighbors in graph G, and is denoted by degi(G). A leaf node is a node that has degree one, i.e., it has only
one neighbor. A path from node v1 to vk in graph G is a sequence of distinct nodes v1v2 · · · vk where there is
an edge between each pair of consecutive nodes of the sequence. The length of a path is the number of edges in
the sequence. We denote the shortest distance between nodes vi and vj in graph G by dG(i, j). If there is no path
from vi to vj , we take dG(i, j) =∞. The diameter of the graph G is maxvi,vj∈N,vi 6=vj dG(i, j). A cycle is a path
of length two or more from a node to itself. A graph G′ = (N ′, E′) is called a subgraph of G = (N,E), denoted
as G′ ⊆ G, if N ′ ⊆ N and E′ ⊆ E ∩ {N ′ ×N ′}. A graph G′ is said to be induced by a set of nodes N ′ ⊆ N if
E′ = E ∩ {N ′ × N ′}. A graph is connected if there is a path from every node to every other node. A subgraph
G′ = (N ′, E′) of G is a component if G′ is connected and there are no edges in G between nodes in N ′ and nodes
in N \N ′.
A tree is a connected acyclic graph. For a connected graph G = (N,E), a connected acyclic subgraph T =
(N,ET ) of G is called a spanning tree of G. A spanning forest of a disconnected graph is a collection of spanning
trees of each of its components.
We denote the complete graph (i.e., the graph with an edge between every pair of different nodes) by Gc =
(N,Ec). We use Ge = (N,φ) to denote the empty graph. Finally, Gs = (N,Es) is a star graph, which is a tree
3graph with one node that is connected to all other nodes. The complement of graph G = (N,E) is denoted by
∼ G = (N,∼ E), where ∼ E , Ec \E. Two graphs on the same set of nodes are said to be disjoint if their edge
sets are disjoint.
III. DISTANCE-BASED UTILITY
A canonical problem in network formation introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky involves distance-based utilities
[8]. In this model, there is a net benefit of b(k) for each pair of nodes that are k hops away from each other in the
network, where b : {1, 2, · · · , n − 1,∞} → R≥0 is a real-valued nonincreasing nonnegative function (i.e., nodes
that are further away from each other provide smaller benefits) and b(∞) = 0. There is a cost c ∈ R>0 for each
edge in the network. The outcome of the network formation process is a graph G = (N,E) ∈ GN . The utility (or
value) of a given graph G ∈ GN is given by the utility function
u(G) =
∑
vi,vj∈N
vi 6=vj
b(dG(i, j)) − c|E|. (1)
In this formulation, there is an inherent trade-off faced by the designer: adding links to a larger number of nodes
provides a larger benefit (by reducing the distances between nodes), but also incurs a larger cost invested in links.
An optimal (or efficient) network G satisfies u(G) ≥ u(G′), ∀G′ ∈ GN .
The following result from [8], [9] shows that when b(·) is a strictly decreasing function, there are only a few
different kinds of efficient networks, depending on the relative values of the link costs and connection benefits.
Proposition 1: [9] Assume that b(·) is a strictly decreasing function. In the distance-based utility model,
• if c < b(1)− b(2), then the complete network is the unique efficient network;
• if b(1) − b(2) < c < b(1) + (n− 2)b(2)/2, then the star is the unique efficient network;
• if b(1) + (n − 2)b(2)/2 < c, then the empty network is the unique efficient network.
In the above proposition, whenever c is equal to one of the specified upper or lower bounds, there will be more
than one efficient network: if c = b(1) − b(2), then the complete network and star network are both efficient, and
if c = b(1) + (n− 2)b(2)/2, the star network and the empty network are both efficient networks with zero utility.
Furthermore, for the more general case where b(·) is nonincreasing, the three networks given by the above result
are still optimal for the corresponding ranges of costs and benefits, although they may no longer be unique.
In the next sections, we will generalize the distance utility framework to the two-layer network formation setting.
We will characterize the complexity of determining efficient networks in such settings and provide properties of
such networks. We will then apply these results to study a multi-layer network formation game with multiple
network designers.
IV. TWO LAYER DISTANCE-BASED UTILITIES:
BEST RESPONSE NETWORK
In the traditional distance-based network formation problem described above, the objective is to minimize the
distances between every possible pair of nodes. However, in many settings, one is only interested in minimizing
distances between certain pairs of nodes. For example, consider a communications system where each node only
wishes to exchange information with a subset of the other nodes, and the task is to design a physical network to
provide short paths between those pairs of nodes. To handle these types of scenarios, in this section we generalize
the study of distance-based network formation to a multi-layer setting. Specifically, suppose that we have a layer
(or graph) G1 = (N,E1), where the edge set E1 specifies a type of relationship between the nodes in N . Our
objective is to design another layer (or graph) G = (N,E) on the same set of nodes, where the utility of the graph
is given by
u(G|G1) =
∑
(vi,vj)∈E1
b(dG(i, j)) − c|E|. (2)
Note that the summation is only over edges in set E1, capturing the fact that only distances between those pairs
of nodes matter in graph G; the traditional distance utility function in (1) is obtained as a special case when G1 is
the complete graph.
4Assume G2 = (N,E2) is a network that maximizes (2); we say G2 is a best response (BR) network to G1, or
equivalently, an efficient network with respect to the utility function (2).
Remark 1: The utility function (2) does not necessarily have a unique maximizer; indeed, in many cases, there
are multiple best response networks with respect to a given network, as demonstrated by Example 1 below.
When G1 is the complete network, the best response is trivially a subgraph of G1. However, the following
example demonstrates that the best response network to a general network G1 does not necessarily have to be a
subgraph of that network.
Example 1: Consider the ring graph G1 with 6 nodes shown in Figure 1(a). Suppose b(1) = c + ǫ, for some
small constant ǫ > 0. Then,
1) The utility (2) of G1 to itself is u(G1|G1) = 6(b(1) − c) = 6ǫ.
2) Any subgraph of G1 with 5 edges is a path graph. This has utility 5(b(1) − c) + b(5) = 5ǫ+ b(5).
3) Any subgraph of G1 with k edges, where k < 5, has utility k(b(1) − c) = kǫ.
Thus, when b(5) > ǫ, the best subgraph of G1 is the path graph with the utility given above.
Now, the star graph shown in Figure 1(b) has utility 2b(1) + 4b(2) − 5c. This is better than the path graph if
4b(2)− 3b(1) > b(5), which holds, for example, when b(2) is sufficiently close to b(1) and b(2) > b(5). Therefore,
for utility functions that satisfy this property, no subgraph of G1 can be a BR to G1.
For certain benefit functions a star is not a BR either. The graph G3 given in Figure 1(c) has utility 4b(1) +
2b(3)− 5c. This is better than the path graph if 2b(3)− b(1) > b(5), and better than the star if b(3) > 2b(2)− b(1).
For instance if c = 1, b(1) = 1.01, b(2) = 0.85, b(3) = 0.8, b(4) = 0.2 and b(5) = 0.1, then the graph G3 is better
than the star graph or any subgraph of G1, i.e., u(G3|G1) > u(G|G1) where G ⊆ G1 or G = G2. In this example,
one can verify (e.g., using a brute-force search) that G3 is in fact a BR network to G1.
It is also instructive to consider the case where b(1) = b(2) = b(3) > max{c, b(4)}. In this case, the graphs
shown in Figure 1(b) and 1(c) are both best response networks to G1 and have higher utility than any subgraph of
G1.
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Fig. 1: Illustration of potential best response networks with respect to network G1.
The above example illustrates that BR networks to an arbitrary graph G1 are very sensitive to the relative values
of the benefit function b(·) and the cost c. Indeed, the shape of the entire benefit function can play a role in
determining the best response to general graphs, whereas only the value of b(1) and b(2) matter when G1 is the
complete graph (as shown in Proposition 1). One of the main results of this paper is to formally characterize the
complexity of finding a best response network to a given graph. To do this, we first cast it as a decision problem
(i.e., a question to which the answer is yes or no) as follows.
Definition 1: Best Response Network (BRN) Problem.
INSTANCE: A network G1 = (N,E1), a nonincreasing benefit function b : {1, 2, · · · , n− 1,∞} → R≥0, an edge
cost c ∈ R>0 and a lower bound on utility given by r ∈ R>0.
QUESTION: For the utility function u(·) given in equation (2), does there exist a G = (N,E) ∈ GN such that
u(G|G1) ≥ r? (3)
Assuming that the input size to a problem is n, if there is an algorithm that solves the problem in O(nk) time
(for some positive constant k), the problem is said to be in the complexity class P. A decision problem is said to
be in the class NP if every “yes” answer has an accompanying certificate that can be verified in polynomial-time.
Consider two decision problems A and B and assume that there exists a polynomial-time transformation from any
instance b of problem B into some instance a of problem A such that the answer to b is “yes” if and only if answer
5to a is “yes”. If such a transformation from B to A exists, it is called a reduction and problem B is said to be
polynomial-time reducible to problem A. A problem A is NP-hard if for all problems B ∈ NP, B is polynomial-
time reducible to A; in particular, A is NP-hard if some other NP-hard problem B is polynomial-time reducible
to A [25]. An NP-hard problem that is also in the class NP is said to be NP-complete. The following theorem
is one of our main results and shows that finding a BR with respect to an arbitrary graph with arbitrary cost and
nonincreasing benefit functions does not have a polynomial-time solution, unless the answer to the long-standing
open question of whether P = NP is affirmative.
Theorem 1: BRN is NP-hard.
We will develop the proof of Theorem 1 over the rest of this section. We will require some intermediate properties
of best response networks, given by the following results.
A. Some Properties of Best Response Networks
Lemma 1: If G2 = (N,E2) is a BR network to G1 = (N,E1), then the number of edges in G2 is less than or
equal to the number of edges in G1. If b(1) > b(2), then G1 and G2 have an equal number of edges if and only
if G2 = G1.
Proof: We use contradiction to prove the first part. Suppose that G2 is a BR and has more edges than G1.
Then
u(G2|G1) =
∑
(u,v)∈E1
b(dG2(u, v)) − c|E2|
≤ |E1|b(1) − c|E2|
< |E1|b(1) − c|E1| = u(G1|G1),
which contradicts our assumption that G2 is a BR to G1. To prove the second part, note that if G2 = G1 then the
number of edges in G2 and G1 are equal. So we only need to show that when b(1) > b(2), if the number of edges
in G2 is equal to the number of edges in G1, then G2 = G1. If G2 6= G1, then there exists a (u, v) ∈ E1 such that
dG2(u, v) ≥ 2. Thus
u(G2|G1) =
∑
(u,v)∈E1
b(dG2(u, v)) − c|E2|
< |E1|b(1) − c|E1| = u(G1|G1),
contradicting the assumption that G2 is a BR to G1.
The next lemma discusses the connectivity of BR networks.
Lemma 2: Suppose that G2 is a best response network to G1 and b(1) > c. Then any two nodes that are connected
by a path in G1 will also be connected by a path in G2. Specifically, if G1 is connected, then G2 must be connected.
Proof: Let u and v be two nodes that are neighbors in G1. By way of contradiction assume that there is no
path between u and v in the BR network G2 = (N,E2). For G′2 = (N,E′2) with E′2 = E2 ∪ {(u, v)},
u(G′2|G1)− u(G2|G1) ≥ b(1) − c > 0,
contradicting the assumption that G2 is a BR network. Now consider the case that u and v are connected through
a path in G1. Then there must be a path from u to v in G2, since we showed that any two nodes that are directly
connected in G1 remain connected in G2.
Remark 2: When b(1) = c, the above proof can be applied to show that there exists a best response network in
which any two nodes that are connected by a path in G1 will also be connected by a path in G2 (although this
does not have to be true of every best response network).
For any integer t ≥ 1, a subgraph H = (N,EH) of G1 = (N,E1) is called a t-spanner if dH(x, y) ≤ t for all
(x, y) ∈ E1, i.e., the distance between each pair of nodes that are neighbors in G1 is not more than t in H [26]. A
subgraph T = (N,ET ) of the graph G1 that is both a t-spanner and a tree is called a tree t-spanner. The following
important lemma characterizes a BR to graphs that have a 2-spanner.
Lemma 3: Suppose graph G1 = (N,E1) has a spanning forest1 F = (N,EF ) that is also a 2-spanner. Assume
that b(1)− b(2) ≤ c ≤ b(1). Then F is a BR to G1.
1Whenever G1 is a connected network, by a spanning forest of G1 we mean a spanning tree.
6Proof: Assume that G1 has m components where m ≥ 1. Since F is a spanning forest, |EF | = |N | − m.
Using the fact that dF (x, y) ≤ 2 for all (x, y) ∈ E1, we have
u(F |G1) = (|N | −m)(b(1) − c) + (|E1| − (|N | −m))b(2). (4)
Now assume that H = (N,EH) is a best response network to G1 such that any two nodes that are connected in
G1 are also connected in H . The existence of such a BR network is guaranteed by Lemma 2 and Remark 2. Thus
|EH | ≥ |N | −m. Also by Lemma 1, we have |EH | ≤ |E1|. Since at most |EH | pairs of neighbors in G1 can be
directly connected in H , the remaining |E1| − |EH | pairs of neighbors in G1 will be at least a distance of two
away from each other in H . Thus we have
u(H|G1) ≤ |EH |(b(1) − c) + (|E1| − |EH |)b(2) (5)
= (|N | −m)(b(1) − c) + (|EH | − (|N | −m))(b(1) − c) + (|E1| − |EH |)b(2)
≤ (|N | −m)(b(1) − c) + (|E1| − (|N | −m))b(2)
= u(F |G1).
Thus F is a BR to the network G1.
The next lemma provides lower and upper bounds on the utility of BR networks when b(1)− b(2) ≤ c ≤ b(1).
Lemma 4: Suppose that b(1)− b(2) ≤ c ≤ b(1) and G2 = (N,E2) is a BR network with respect to an arbitrary
connected network G1 = (N,E1). Then
|E1|(b(1) − c) ≤ u(G2|G1) ≤ (|N | − 1)(b(1) − c) + (|E1| − |N |+ 1)b(2). (6)
Proof: The lower bound follows from the fact that u(G2|G1) ≥ u(G1|G1) = |E1|(b(1) − c), by virtue of G2
being a BR network. For the upper bound, note that since b(1) ≥ c, G2 can be assumed to be a connected graph
(by Lemma 2 and Remark 2) and thus |E2| ≥ |N | − 1. The rest of the proof follows the same procedure as in the
proof of Lemma 3 with m = 1.
Remark 3: The inequalities given in the above lemma are sharp. As we will show later in this paper, a BR to a
tree is the same tree if b(1) ≥ c. For a tree, the left and right hand sides of inequality (6) are equal. Also, for a
graph G1 with a tree 2-spanner T , we know that T is a BR to G1 by Lemma 3 with utility equal to the right hand
side of inequality (6).
B. Proof of NP-Hardness of the BRN Problem
We now return to the BRN problem (Definition 1) and the claim of NP-hardness given in Theorem 1. To prove
this theorem, we will construct a reduction from the Tree t-spanner Problem [26], defined below.
Definition 2: Tree t-Spanner (TtS) Problem.
INSTANCE: A connected graph G = (N,E) and a positive integer t.
QUESTION: Does G have a tree t-spanner, i.e., a subgraph T = (N,ET ) such that |ET | = |N |−1 and dT (x, y) ≤ t
for all (x, y) ∈ E?
The TtS problem is in P for t = 2, but NP-complete for all t ≥ 4; the complexity of the problem for t = 3 is
still unknown [26]. We are now in place to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: We will construct a reduction from the TtS problem to the BRN problem, which will
then imply that the BRN problem is NP-hard. Consider an instance of the TtS problem with graph G = (N,E)
and t = 4. Any spanning tree of G with |N | ≤ 5 is a tree 4-spanner which is easy to find. Thus, we assume that
|N | ≥ 6. Define the corresponding instance of the BRN problem as follows. The network G1 = (N,E1) is the
same as the graph G, i.e., G1 = G. The benefit function b(·) and edge-cost c are chosen to satisfy
b(1) > b(2) = b(3) = b(4) > b(5),
b(1)− b(2) < c < b(1).
(7)
For example c = 2, b(1) = 3, b(2) = b(3) = b(4) = 2 and b(k) = 0 ∀k ≥ 5 satisfies these conditions. Finally set
r = (|N | − 1)(b(1) − c) + (|E1| − (|N | − 1))b(2). (8)
7Clearly we can construct the above BRN instance in polynomial time. Now assume that the answer to the instance
of the TtS problem is “yes”, i.e., graph G has a tree 4-spanner T = (N,ET ). This means that T is a subtree of
G1 and dT (x, y) ≤ 4 for all (x, y) ∈ E1. Thus we have that
u(T |G1) =
∑
(x,y)∈E1\ET
b(dT (x, y)) + (|N | − 1)(b(1) − c)
= (|E1| − (|N | − 1))b(2) + (|N | − 1)(b(1) − c)
= r.
Note that we used the fact that b(2) = b(3) = b(4) to go from the first line to the second line in the above equation.
Therefore, the answer to the defined instance of the BRN problem is also “yes”.
To complete the proof, we have to show that if the answer to the constructed instance of the BRN is “yes”,
then the answer to the instance of the TtS is “yes”. In other words, we have to show that if there exists a graph
G2 = (N,E2) such that
u(G2|G1) =
∑
(x,y)∈E1
b(dG2(x, y))− c|E2| ≥ r,
where b(·) and c satisfy (7) and r is given by (8), then G1 has a tree 4-spanner. We claim that any G2 with utility
at least r must be a tree 4-spanner of G1.
Assume that G2 = (N,E2) is a graph with u(G2|G1) ≥ r. Since r is equal to the upper bound of the utility
of the BR (by Lemma 4), G2 must be a best response to G1. Since b(1) > c, by Lemma 2 we know that G2 is a
connected graph. Therefore, |E2| ≥ |N | − 1. First consider the case that |E2| > |N | − 1. Then similar to equation
(5), we have that
u(G2|G1) ≤ |E2|(b(1) − c) + (|E1| − |E2|)b(2)
= (|N | − 1)(b(1) − c) + (|E2| − (|N | − 1))(b(1) − c) + (|E1| − |E2|)b(2)
< (|N | − 1)(b(1) − c) + (|E2| − (|N | − 1))b(2) + (|E1| − |E2|)b(2)
= (|N | − 1)(b(1) − c) + (|E1| − (|N | − 1))b(2) = r,
which is a contradiction. Thus consider the case that |E2| = |N | − 1, i.e., G2 is tree. Denoting |E2 ∩E1| = γ, we
have
u(G2|G1) = γ(b(1) − c)− (|N | − 1− γ)c+
∑
(x,y)∈E1\E2
b(dG2(x, y)) (9)
≤ γ(b(1) − c)− (|N | − 1− γ)c+ (|E1| − γ)b(2)
= γ(b(1) − c) + (|N | − 1− γ)(b(2) − c) + (|E1| − (|N | − 1))b(2).
If γ < |N | − 1, since b(1)− c > b(2) − c, by equation (9) we have that
u(G2|G1) < γ(b(1) − c) + (|N | − 1− γ)(b(1) − c) + (|E1| − (|N | − 1))b(2) = r,
which is again a contradiction. Therefore, |E2 ∩ E1| = γ = |N | − 1. This means that G2 is a subtree of G1. Now
if there exists (u, v) ∈ E1 such that dG2(u, v) > 4, then we have
u(G2|G1) = (|N | − 1)(b(1) − c) +
∑
(x,y)∈E1\E2
b(dG2(x, y))
< (|N | − 1)(b(1) − c) + (|E1| − (|N | − 1))b(2)
= r,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that b(2) = b(3) = b(4) > b(d) for all d > 4. Therefore, for all
(u, v) ∈ E1, dG2(u, v) ≤ 4 which means that G2 must be a tree 4-spanner for the graph G1. Thus the answer to
the instance of the TtS problem is “yes”. This shows that the NP-hard problem TtS (for t = 4) is polynomial-time
reducible to BRN, and therefore BRN is NP-hard.
There are certain NP-hard optimization problems (e.g., minimum vertex cover) whose solutions can be approx-
imated to within a constant factor by simple greedy algorithms [25]. The following example considers a natural
8greedy algorithm where edges are added or removed one at a time, and shows that this algorithm can produce
results that are arbitrarily far away from the optimal network.
Example 2: Consider a greedy algorithm where at each step, we add or remove a link that provides the highest
increase in the utility until no further improvements can be made. The following scenarios illustrate the pitfalls of
such an algorithm.
Consider a reference network G1. Suppose we attempt to build a BR network by starting with an empty network
G and repeatedly adding edges. If b(1) < c, then adding any single edge to G will result in negative utility, and
thus the algorithm stops with the empty network. Since there can exist nonempty BR networks when b(1) < c
whose utility is unbounded in n (e.g., see Proposition 1), the network produced by the above algorithm can be
arbitrarily bad in comparison to the true BR network.
Now suppose that we attempt to build a BR network by starting with the reference network G1 and removing
edges one at a time. Consider the graph G1 depicted in Figure 2(a) and define c = 1, b(1) = n−1n−2 , b(2) = 0.5,
b(k) = 0 for 3 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
Starting with G1, removing any of the edges increases the utility by b(2)−(b(1)−c). Thus any edge is a candidate
for removal. Consider removing the edge (v1, v2) which results in network G2. Now no further improvements are
possible by adding or removing a single edge. Next, consider network G3 shown in the Figure 2(c). As we will
show in Proposition 3 in Section VI, G3 is a best response network to G1. We have
lim
n→∞
u(G3|G1)
u(G2|G1)
= lim
n→∞
(n− 1)(b(1) − c) + (n− 2)b(2)
2(n − 2)(b(1) − c) + b(2)
=∞.
v1v2
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v4
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(a) G1
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(c) G3
Fig. 2: Performance of a greedy algorithm. Graph G1 in (a) is the reference network. Graph G2 in (b) is the output of the
greedy algorithm discussed above. Graph G3 in (c) is a best response to G1.
Note that same conclusion is reached even if we start with the complete graph, i.e., we can remove the edges in
such a way that we end up in network G2. Thus this greedy algorithm can perform arbitrarily poorly in comparison
to the optimal solution.
An important avenue for further research is to find approximation algorithms (and achievable approximation
ratios) for the BRN problem.
C. Comparison to Other Network Design Problems
The problem of optimally designing networks is classical in the computer science and algorithms literature.
Perhaps the most common instance is the minimum spanning tree (MST) problem which is to find a spanning tree
of a weighted graph that has the least overall weight; there are greedy algorithms that solve MST in polynomial time
[25]. Here, we compare the BRN problem to two canonical network design problems that also attempt to minimize
distances between pairs of nodes: the Optimal Communication Spanning Tree (OCST) problem introduced in [27],
and the Simple Network Design problem (SNDP) introduced in [28].
In the OCST problem, for each pair of nodes vi, vj ∈ N , there is a communication requirement rij ∈ N. The
goal of the network designer is to construct a tree T on the node set N such that
∑
i 6=j rijdT (i, j) is minimized.
This problem is polynomial-time solvable for any set of rij [27].
In the SNDP problem, one is given an undirected graph G = (N,E) and a criterion C ∈ N. The objective is to
determine if there exists a subgraph G′ = (N,E′) of G with at most |N | − 1 edges such that
∑
i 6=j dG′(i, j) ≤ C .
It was shown in [28] that this problem is NP-complete.
The relationships between the BRN, OCST and SNDP problems are as follows.
9• The OCST and SNDP problems explicitly constrain the number of edges in the designed network, whereas
the BRN problem includes the cost of edges in the utility function.
• The SNDP problem requires the designed network to be a subgraph of another given network, whereas the
BRN and OCST problems place no such constraint.
• The objective of the SNDP problem is to minimize the sum of distances between all pairs of nodes, whereas
the BRN and OCST problems allow the objective function to only depend on distances between selected pairs
of nodes (the OCST problem does this by setting rij = 0 for those pairs that do not wish to communicate).
Despite the apparent similarities between the BRN problem and the OCST problem, Theorem 1 shows that the
BRN problem is NP-hard, even though the OCST problem can be solved in polynomial-time. This increase in
complexity is a byproduct of the additional flexibility afforded by the general nonincreasing benefit function in the
BRN problem (as opposed to the scaled distances in the utility function for the OCST problem), which allows it
to capture the tree-t-spanner problem as a special case.
In the next section of this paper, we will characterize further properties of BR networks; these will allow us to
find BR networks with respect to certain specific classes of graphs, which in turn will allow us to formulate and
study a multi-layer network formation setting with multiple network designers.
V. FURTHER PROPERTIES OF BEST RESPONSE NETWORKS
The proofs of all results in this section are given in Appendix A.
Lemma 5: Let G2 be a BR network to G1, and suppose that G2 is not connected. Let G2i = (Ni, E2i),
i = 1, . . . , k, be the components of G2. Let G1i = (Ni, E1i), i = 1, 2, . . . , k, be the subgraphs induced by vertex
sets Ni on G1. Then network G2i must be a BR network to G1i for i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
The following lemma considers the case when there are isolated nodes in G1.
Lemma 6: Let G1 = (N,E1) and suppose v ∈ N is an isolated node. Then v is isolated in any BR to G1.
The properties described above are independent of the relative values of the benefit function and edge costs. The
following set of results provide more details of the BR networks for certain ranges of benefits and costs.
Lemma 7: Let G1 = (N,E1) be an arbitrary graph.
1) If b(1)− c > b(2), then the unique BR network to G1 is G2 = G1.
2) If b(1) < c, then G1 is not a BR network to G1, unless G1 is the empty network.
3) Define
α , max
2≤|S|,S⊆N
|EG1(S, S)|
|S| − 1
− 1, (10)
where EG1(S, S) denotes the set of edges in G1 that have both of their endpoints in the set S, i.e., EG1(S, S) =
E1 ∩ (S × S). If c > b(1) + αb(2), then the unique BR network with respect to G1 is the empty network.
The parameter α is a measure of the edge density of the underlying graph,2 and thus the threshold to have the
empty network as the best response network increases as the underlying graph becomes more dense. The following
example illustrates the implication of α for various graphs.
Example 3: In the following, we define |N | = n.
• Assume that G1 = (N,E1) is the complete graph. Then |EG1(S, S)| =
(
|S|
2
)
for any (non-singleton) S ⊆ N
and thus α = n−22 in equation (10). This means that the BR to the complete graph is the empty graph for
c > b(1) + n−22 b(2), yielding part (iii) of Proposition 1 (obtained in [9]) as a special case of Lemma 7.
• Suppose that G1 = (N,E1) is a tree. Since any induced subgraph of a tree is a forest (it is a tree when the
subgraph is connected), we have |EG1(S, S)| ≤ |S| − 1 for any non-singleton S ⊆ N . Thus
|EG1(S, S)|
|S| − 1
− 1 ≤ 0 ∀S ⊆ N, |S| ≥ 2.
This means that α = 0 (which happens for any S that induces a connected subgraph on G1). Therefore, we
can conclude that the BR network to a tree is the empty network when c > b(1).
2There exist efficient algorithms to find maximally dense subgraphs in networks [29].
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• Consider a cycle graph G1 = (N,E1) with n nodes.3 Any induced subgraph of G1 on a non-singleton node
set S ⊂ N is an acyclic graph and thus |EG1(S, S)| ≤ |S| − 1. For S = N , we have |EG1(N,N)| = n. Thus
α = 1n−1 , and the BR network to G1 is the empty network for c > b(1) +
1
n−1b(2).
Remark 4: Note that when b(2) = 0, Lemma 7 indicates that for b(1) > c, G1 is a unique BR to itself (for any
network G1), and when b(1) < c, the empty network is a unique best response (both G1 and the empty network
are best responses with utility 0 when b(1) = c). Thus, in the rest of the paper, we will assume that b(2) > 0.
In the next lemma, we consider the case that we have nodes with degree one in the graph.
Lemma 8: Let G1 = (N,E1), and suppose v ∈ N is a leaf node. Define the induced subgraph of G1 under the
node set N \ {v} as G11 = (N \ {v}, E11) (i.e., the graph obtained by removing node v and its incident edge).
Then a BR to G1 can be obtained by first finding a BR to G11 and then adding v as an isolated node if b(1) ≤ c,
or adding v together with a single edge to its neighbor in G1 if b(1) ≥ c.
The above lemma provides the following method to simplify the task of finding a best response network. Given
a graph G1, we recursively remove nodes of degree 1 until we are left with a graph where all nodes have degree
two or larger (this is known as peeling the graph, and the resulting subgraph is known as a 2-core [30]). A best
response to the 2-core can then be found using whatever means necessary, and then the removed nodes can be
recursively added back as isolated nodes (if b(1) ≤ c), or with the single edge that was removed (if b(1) ≥ c).
VI. BEST RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC NETWORKS
We will now apply the above results to characterize best responses to acyclic networks and networks with a
star subgraph. The latter models, for example, sensor or communication networks where one or more base stations
or fusion centers wish to communicate with all nodes, while the other nodes only need to communicate locally
amongst themselves. The proofs of the following two propositions are provided in Appendix B.
Proposition 2: Let G1 = (N,E1) be a forest.
• If b(1) < c, the empty network is the unique BR to G1.
• If b(1) > c, then G2 = G1 is a BR network to G1.
• If b(1) = c, the empty network and G2 = G1 are both BR networks to G1.
• For b(1) > max{b(2), c}, the unique BR to G1 is G2 = G1.
Proposition 3: Let G1 = (N,E1) be a graph that has a star subgraph centered at node v ∈ N .
• If b(1) − b(2) > c, then G1 is the unique BR to G1.
• If b(1) − b(2) ≤ c ≤ b(1), then the star network centered at node v is a BR network to G1.
• If b(1) ≤ c, one of the following networks is a BR to G1:
1) A star network on N with center at node v.
2) A network where one component is a star and all other components are isolated nodes.
3) The empty network.
VII. MULTI-LAYER NETWORK FORMATION GAME WITH STRATEGIC SUBSTITUTES
In the previous sections, we considered the scenario where a network designer chooses an optimal graph (or layer)
G2 with respect to a given graph G1. In this section, we will build on this formulation to consider a scenario where
multiple network designers are building layers, with a utility for each layer that depends on the structure of that
layer and the layers constructed by the other designers. This models, for instance, different mail and courier service
companies designing their individual networks to service their customers, or different transportation networks (air,
rail, bus) arising between a set of cities [21], [24], [31]. We start by defining an m-player game where each player
corresponds to one of the layers.
Definition 3: A Multi-Layer Network Formation Game has a set of m players P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pm}. The strategy
space for each of the players is defined to be GN where N = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, i.e., the set of all graphs on node
set N . For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, let Gi = (N,Ei) ∈ GN denote the action of player Pi. The utility of player Pi
is given by a function Ai : GN ×GN × · · · ×GN → R, where the jth argument is the action of the jth player for
1 ≤ j ≤ m.
3A cycle graph with n nodes consists of only one cycle of length n.
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We will use G−i to denote the vector of actions of all players except player Pi, and use Ai(Gi, G−i) to denote
the utility of player Pi with respect to the given vector (G1, G2, . . . , Gm). Based on the definition of the game, we
say that a vector of networks (G1, G2, . . . , Gm) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if Gi ∈ argmaxGAi(G,G−i)
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. In this case, Gi is said to be a BR network to G−i with respect to the utility function Ai.
The characteristics of the game and the optimal strategies for each player will depend on the form of the utility
functions Ai. Here, as a starting point for studying such games, we will focus on distance-based utilities (thereby
building on our results from the first part of the paper). The reference networks for the distance-based utility function
for each player will depend on the networks constructed by the other players. In the remainder of the paper, we will
explore functions that view different layers of the network as strategic substitutes, where the presence of a link in
one layer makes it less desirable for that link to appear in another layer; this captures the notion that the different
network layers are attempting to fill gaps in connectivity left by the other layers.4 As a motivating example, consider
competing transportation companies offering services between a common set of cities. Suppose that for economical
reasons, each company would prefer to design its transportation network to provide short routes between those
cities that are not directly serviced by any other company. In other words, each company designs its network with
respect to the complement of the transportation networks provided by all other companies. If we impose further
structure on such games by assuming distance-based utility functions, we obtain the game defined below. In the
following definition, for a set of graphs Gj = (N,Ej), j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, on a common set of nodes, we use the
notation ∪mj=1Gj to indicate the graph G = (N,∪mj=1Ej), and ∩mj=1Gj to indicate the graph G = (N,∩mj=1Ej).
Definition 4: The game in Definition 3 is said to be a Multi-Layer Network Formation Game with Strategic
Substitutes and Distance-Utilities if the utility functions are of the form
Ai(G1, . . . , Gm) = ui(Gi| ∼ (∪
m
j=1,j 6=iGj)) (11)
=
∑
(x,y)/∈∪mk=1,k 6=iEk
bi(dGi(x, y)) − ci|Ei|,
where the function ui is defined in (2); the benefit functions bi(·) are nonnegative, nonincreasing and satisfy
bi(∞) = 0, and all costs ci are positive. The benefit functions and costs can be different for the different players.
It is clear from the definition of the game that (G1, G2, . . . , Gm) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Gi is a BR network with respect to ∼ (∪mj=1,j 6=iGj) for the utility function (2). Although we
showed in Theorem 1 that finding a BR network with respect to this utility function is NP-hard in general, we
now show that certain insights can nevertheless be obtained in the multiplayer setting (regardless of the number
of nodes and players). To develop our results, we partition the set of players P into three sets: high-cost players
SH = {Pi ∈ P |ci > bi(1)}, medium-cost players SM = {Pi ∈ P |bi(1) ≥ ci ≥ bi(1) − bi(2)} and low-cost players
SL = {Pi ∈ P |bi(1)− bi(2) > ci}. We start by considering the case where the game contains low-cost players.
A. Games Containing Low-Cost Players
Proposition 4: Suppose |SL| ≥ 1. Then in every Nash equilibrium, every player in SH chooses the empty network.
Furthermore, any vector of disjoint networks (G1, G2, . . . , Gm) forms a Nash equilibrium when {Gk|Pk ∈ SM} is
a set of disjoint forests and ∪i∈SLGi = ∼ ∪i∈SMGi.
Proof: Let (G1, G2, . . . , Gm) be any vector of networks in Nash equilibrium. Since there exists at least one
player Pi whose edge cost satisfies ci < bi(1)−bi(2), the Nash equilibrium vector must satisfy ∪mj=1Gj = Gc, where
Gc is the complete network. To see this, suppose that the union of the graphs is not the complete network; then
there exists some edge (u, v) that does not appear in any network, and thus appears in the complement of the graph
∪mj=1,j 6=iGj . By Lemma 7, the BR to ∼ ∪mj=1,j 6=iGj with respect to player Pi’s utility function is ∼ ∪mj=1,j 6=iGj ,
and thus the edge (u, v) appears in graph Gi, contradicting the fact that it does not appear in the union of all the
graphs.
Next, note that since ∪mj=1Gj = Gc, for any player Pk ∈ P , the graph Gk = (N,Ek) is a BR to the graph
Gc \ {∪mj=1,j 6=kGj} ⊆ Gk. By Lemma 1, a BR to a graph cannot be a strict superset of that graph, and thus we
have that Gk is a best response to itself with respect to the utility function of player Pk. Now if Pk ∈ SH , we
4One can also consider a strategic complements version of this class of games where each player wishes to provide short paths between
those pairs of nodes that share an edge in each of the other layers. The analysis of such games is relatively straightforward and thus we
focus on strategic substitutes in this paper.
12
know from Lemma 7 that Gk must be the empty network, completing the first part of the proof. For the second
part, note that for any vector of networks satisfying the given properties, Proposition 2 and Lemma 7 indicate that
a best response to Gk is indeed Gk for Pk ∈ SM ∪ SL, completing the proof.
The above result shows that the presence of a player with low edge costs (relative to its own benefit function)
guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the game, and furthermore, such low-cost players drive players
with sufficiently high edge costs out of the game; the proposition provides the threshold for costs at which this
occurs (namely bi(1) < ci). Players with medium edge costs, on the other hand, can obtain certain nonempty
networks in equilibrium, and the players with low edge costs split all of the remaining edges amongst themselves.
We now study the situation where there are no low-cost players in the game (i.e., SL = ∅). We start by considering
games that contain only high-cost players.
B. Games Containing Only High-Cost Players
Suppose P = SH (i.e., SL = SM = ∅). For each player Pi ∈ P , define the index ki as
ki , min
{
t ∈ N | ci < bi(1) +
t− 2
2
bi(2)
}
.
Since ci > bi(1), we have ki ≥ 3 for all Pi ∈ P . If ki > n, by Lemma 7, the empty network is a BR of player Pi to
any set of networks G−i (since α in (10) satisfies α ≤ n−22 for any reference graph). Thus without loss of generality,
assume that all players have 3 ≤ ki ≤ n and players are sorted according to their ki, i.e., k1 ≤ k2 ≤ · · · ≤ km ≤ n.
We will now partition the set of players P into different sets.
Define the index i1 as
i1 , max {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} | ki ≤ n− i+ 1} .
Next, define
i2 , max {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i1 − 1} | ki ≤ i1 − i+ 1} ,
i3 , max {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i2 − 1} | ki ≤ i2 − i+ 1} ,
.
.
. (12)
ir , max {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ir−1 − 1} | ki ≤ ir−1 − i+ 1} ,
where ir satisfies ir < k1 (so that no further sets of this form can be defined).
The above indices satisfy 1 ≤ ir < ir−1 < · · · < i1 ≤ m. Partition the set of players and nodes as follows
Hr = {P1, . . . , Pir}, Vr = {v1, . . . , vir}
Hr−1 = {Pir+1, . . . , Pir−1}, Vr−1 = {vir+1, . . . , vir−1}
.
.
. (13)
H1 = {Pi2+1, . . . , Pi1}, V1 = {vi2+1, . . . , vi1}.
Also define H0 = {Pi1+1, Pi1+2, . . . , Pm} and V0 = {vi1+1, vi1+2, . . . , vn}.
Proposition 5: For each player Pj ∈ Hl (for 1 ≤ l ≤ r), define the network Gj to be the star network centered on
node vj with peripheral nodes ∪l−1t=0Vt, where Hl and Vt are defined as in equation (13). For each player Pj ∈ H0,
define Gj to be the empty network. Then the set of networks (G1, G2, . . . , Gm) forms a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of the above proposition is given in Appendix C. The following example illustrates the structure of
the Nash equilibrium specified by the above proposition.
Example 4: Suppose that there are 11 nodes and 9 high-cost players with ki = 3 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, k6 = 4, k7 = 5
and k8, k9 ≥ 5. From the equations in (12), we get i1 = 7, i2 = 5, i3 = 3 and i4 = 1. Figure 3 demonstrates
the networks of players P1, P2, P4 and P6 in the Nash equilibrium defined in Proposition 5. Player P3 has a
similar network to player P2 (except that the star of her network is centered on v3). Players P5 and P7 have similar
networks to that of P4 and P6, respectively (the only difference being that player P5 has a star centered on v5, and
P7 has a star centered on v7). Players P8 and P9 each have the empty network.
Despite the stylized nature of the multi-layer network formation game in Definition 4, it is of interest to note that
the “hub-and-spoke” networks that arise in the above Nash equilibrium are predominant in real-world transportation
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v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11
V4 V3 V2 V1 V0
(a) Partition of the nodes.
V4 V3 V2 V1 V0
(b) G1
V4 V3 V2 V1 V0
(c) G2
V4 V3 V2 V1 V0
(d) G4
V4 V3 V2 V1 V0
(e) G6
Fig. 3: A multi-layer network formation game considered in Example 4 with 9 high-cost players and 11 nodes. Nodes are
partitioned into 5 sets as shown in Figure 3(a), based on the characteristics of the players. Each node in each of the sets
V1, V2, V3, V4 will be chosen by a different player as the center of a star subgraph in the Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium
networks of players P1, P2, P4 and P6 are shown in 3(b), 3(c), 3(d) and 3(e), respectively. The networks of players P3, P5
and P7 are not shown; they have stars centered on v3, v5 and v7, respectively, with the same peripheral nodes as P2, P4 and
P6, respectively. Players P8 and P9 choose the empty network.
systems (airline networks, in particular) [21], [24], [31]. While previous work has shown that such networks are
optimal in the single-layer setting (e.g., Proposition 1 [9]), our analysis shows that these structures also arise when
players selfishly optimize their individual networks in competitive environments. We will now consider games with
a mix of medium-cost and high-cost players, and show that such structures also arise as a Nash equilibrium in that
setting.
C. Games With Medium and High-Cost Players
Proposition 6: Suppose that SL = ∅, and assume without loss of generality that the first µ players in P
are medium-cost players, with 1 ≤ µ ≤ n. For j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , µ}, define the network Gj to be the star net-
work centered on node vj with peripheral nodes {vj+1, vj+2, . . . , vn}. For the set of high-cost players SH , let
(Gµ+1, Gµ+2, . . . , Gm) be the Nash equilibrium networks on node set {vµ+1, vµ+2, . . . , vn} defined in Proposition 5.
Then the set of networks (G1, G2, . . . , Gm) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: In the proof, we will use the fact that each network Gj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, only contains edges from node vj
to nodes with index larger than j. For each player Pj , let Gj,ref ,
⋃m
i=1,i 6=j Gj be the union of the networks of
the other players.
Consider a medium-cost player Pj , where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , µ}. Since all players with index smaller than j are
medium-cost players, for each node vi with i < j, Gj,ref contains an edge from node vi to vk for all k >
i. Furthermore, Gj,ref contains no edge from vk to vj for any k > j. Thus, in the network ∼ Gj,ref , nodes
v1, v2, . . . , vj−1 are isolated, and there is an edge from vj to each node vk with k > j. By Lemma 6, the isolated
nodes in ∼ Gj,ref remain isolated in the BR; applying Proposition 3, a star network centered at vj with edges to
{vj+1, . . . , vn} is a BR with respect to ∼ Gj,ref . Thus, Gj is a BR to ∼ Gj,ref .
Now consider a high-cost player Pj , where j ∈ {µ+1, µ+2, . . . ,m}. Arguing as above, nodes v1, v2, . . . , vµ are
isolated in the network ∼ Gj,ref . Thus by Lemma 6, those nodes remain isolated in the BR to ∼ Gj,ref . Since this
is true for all high-cost players, we can remove the nodes v1, v2, . . . , vµ from consideration, and focus on showing
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that the subgraph of Gj induced by the node set {vµ+1, vµ+2, . . . , vn} is a BR to the graphs (Gµ+1, Gµ+2, . . . , Gm)
on that node set. This is true by construction, and thus the given set of networks is a Nash equilibrium.
Example 5: Consider a game with 13 nodes, 2 medium-cost players (P1 and P2) and 9 high-cost players
(P3, · · · , P11). Assume that the 9 high-cost players are the same as the high-cost players in Example 4. Based
on Proposition 6, each of the medium-cost players P1 and P2 will have a star network centered on node v1 and
v2, with peripheral nodes V \ {v1} and V \ {v1, v2}, respectively. These networks are shown in Figure 4(b) and
4(c), respectively. The networks of the remaining players (which have high costs) have the same structure as in
Example 4 with two extra isolated nodes, v1 and v2. Once again, we see that hub-and-spoke networks arise as a
Nash equilibrium in this setting.
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13
M V4 V3 V2 V1 V0
(a) Partition of the nodes.
(b) G1 (c) G2
Fig. 4: Figure 4(a) demonstrates the partition of the set of nodes into 6 sets. The first set (denoted M ) contains nodes that
will form the centers of the star networks chosen by the medium cost players P1 and P2. These star networks are depicted
in Figures 4(b) and 4(c). The networks of the remaining high-cost players have the same structure as the networks shown in
Figures 3(b) to 3(e), with v1 and v2 as isolated nodes.
The following corollary immediately follows from Propositions 4, 5 and 6.
Corollary 1: The multi-layer network formation game with strategic substitutes and distance-utilities has a pure
Nash equilibrium for any set of players.
VIII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we introduced and studied the problem of strategic multi-layer network formation. We generalized
distance-based network formation to multi-layer networks, and showed that the problem of finding an optimal
network in this setting is NP-hard. We characterized certain properties of optimal networks, and found the optimal
networks for certain special cases of reference graphs. Next, we formulated a multi-layer network formation game
where each player builds a different layer of the network. When the layers are viewed as strategic substitutes, we
showed that the Nash equilibria of the game exhibit certain natural characteristics. Specifically, the presence of low-
cost players pushes high-cost players out of the game, and hub-and-spoke networks arise in the Nash equilibrium
when there are no low-cost players.
There are many interesting avenues for further research. (1) Deriving approximation algorithms with provable
performance guarantees is a natural approach to dealing with the inherent complexity of finding optimal networks; a
deeper investigation of the connections between t-spanners and the best response network design problem might lead
to such algorithms. (2) Our initial simulations show that sequential best response dynamics converge to the Nash
equilibria that we identified in this paper; providing formal proofs of convergence and understanding other non-
simultaneous variants (such as Stackelberg games) is an important avenue for research. (3) While we have focused
on distance-based utilities with strategic substitutes in this paper, it would also be of interest to study other classes
of utility functions in the multi-layer network formation game. (4) A mechanism to incorporate stochasticity and
partial information into the network formation process would be of value in modeling and gaining further insights
into the formation of realistic networks.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR SECTION V
A. Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: Consider the utility of network G2 with respect to G1. Since there are no edges between the components
in G2, for any (u, v) ∈ E1 with u and v in different components of G2, dG2(u, v) =∞. Thus
∑
(u,v)∈E1
b(dG2(u, v)) =∑k
i=1
∑
(u,v)∈E1i
b(dG2i(u, v)), and the utility function can be written as
u(G2|G1) =
∑
(u,v)∈E1
b(dG2(u, v)) − c|E2|
=
k∑
i=1

 ∑
(u,v)∈E1i
b(dG2i(u, v)) − c|E2i|


= u(G21|G11) + · · ·+ u(G2k|G1k).
Now, if G2i is not a BR to G1i for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, replace it with a BR. This will increase the utility,
contradicting the fact that G2 is a BR.
B. Proof of Lemma 6
Proof: Let G2 = (N,E2) be a BR network with respect to G1, and suppose by way of contradiction that
v not isolated in G2. If v is a leaf node in G2 (i.e., it has a single neighbor), then the edge incident to v is not
used in any of the shortest paths between nodes in N \ {v}. Removing that edge increases the utility of G2 by c,
contradicting the fact that it is a BR.
Now suppose that v has two or more neighbors in G2, and denote those neighbors by the set J = {vj1 , vj2 , . . . , vjl} ⊆
N \ {v} with l ≥ 2. Construct a new network G3 = (N,E3) with
E3 = (E2 \ {(v, vj1), (v, vj2), . . . , (v, vjl)}) ∪ {(vj1 , vj2), (vj1 , vj3), . . . , (vj1 , vjl)}, (14)
i.e., we remove the l edges from v to its neighbors and add edges from vj1 ∈ J to the other nodes in J . This results
in a net removal of at least one edge from the graph. Suppose that the shortest path between some pair of nodes
in N \ {v} passed through v in G2; the shortest path now passes through vj1 in G3, and is at least as short as the
original shortest path. Thus u(G3|G1) > u(G2|G1) which contradicts the assumption that G2 is a BR network to
G1. Therefore, v must be an isolated node in G2.
C. Proof of Lemma 7
Proof: In order to prove the first property, assume by way of contradiction that G2 is a BR network and
G2 6= G1. Since b(1) > b(2), by Lemma 1, we know that the number of edges in G2 is less than in G1. So there
are vertices u and v such that (u, v) ∈ E1 and dG2(u, v) > 1. Adding the edge (u, v) to E2 increases the utility
by at least b(1) − c − b(2) > 0 which contradicts the assumption that G2 6= G1 is a BR network. Therefore, the
BR network must be equal to G1.
For the second property note that if G2 = G1 6= φ, then u(G2|G1) = |E1|(b(1) − c) < 0 due to the assumption
that b(1) < c. Thus it must be the case that G2 6= G1, or G1 is the empty network.
Finally in order to prove the third property, consider an arbitrary graph G1 = (N,E1) with n nodes. By way of
contradiction assume that G2 6= φ is a BR network with respect to G1. Let G21 = (N1, E21) be a component of
network G2 with 1 < |N1| ≤ n. By Lemma 5, we know that G21 must be a BR to the subgraph induced by the
node set N1 on G1, which we denote by G11 = (N1, E11). Thus
u(G21|G11) ≤ |E21|(b(1) − c) + (|E11| − |E21|)b(2)
= |E21|(b(1) − c+ αb(2)) + (|E11| − |E21|(1 + α))b(2)
= |E21|(b(1) − c+ αb(2)) + |E21|
(
|E11|
|E21|
− (1 + α)
)
b(2). (15)
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Due to the assumption that c > b(1) + αb(2), the first term in (15) is negative. Also, we have that
|E11|
|E21|
≤
|E11|
|N1| − 1
=
|EG1(N1, N1)|
|N1| − 1
≤ max
2≤|S|,S⊆N
|EG1(S, S)|
|S| − 1
= α+ 1.
The first inequality above follows from the fact that G21 is a component and thus has at least |N1|− 1 edges. Thus
the second term in equation (15) is nonpositive. Therefore, u(G21|G11) < 0 which is a contradiction. As a result
G21 (and thereby G2) must be the empty network.
D. Proof of Lemma 8
Proof: Let the neighbor of v in G1 be denoted by u, and assume that network H = (N,EH) is a BR to
network G1. We reason as we did in the proof of Lemma 6, with a few additional details.
Consider the case that b(1) ≤ c. Suppose that node v is not isolated in H , and let J = {vj1 , vj2 , . . . , vjl} ⊆ N\{v}
be the neighbors of v in H . If l = 1 (i.e., v has a single neighbor in H), the edge (v, vj1) is not used in any of
the shortest paths between nodes in N \ {v}. Removing that edge saves a cost of c, and loses at most a benefit of
b(1) (due to the loss of the path from v to u in H). Since b(1) ≤ c, the resulting graph has utility at least as large
as H .
Now suppose l > 1. Construct the new network H1 = (N,EH1) with edge set
EH1 , (EH \ {(v, vj1), (v, vj2), . . . , (v, vjl)}) ∪ {(vj1 , vj2), (vj1 , vj3), . . . , (vj1 , vjl)}. (16)
In other words, we remove all of the incident edges from v in H and add edges from each node in J \ {vj1} to
vj1 . This saves at least one edge, and dH1(x, y) ≤ dH(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ E1. Thus, the only drop in utility in
graph H1 arises from the loss of the path from node v to u. Again, since b(1) ≤ c, the graph H1 has utility at least
equal to the utility of the network H and thus H1 is also a best response. The above two cases show that when
b(1) ≤ c, there exists a best response where the leaf node v is isolated.
Now consider the case where b(1) ≥ c. Then by Lemma 2 and Remark 2, there exists a BR network H = (N,EH)
containing a path from v to u. If v is a leaf node in H , it is straightforward to show that there exists a BR network
H ′ where v is connected to u. Thus suppose v is connected to the node set J = {vj1 , vj2 , . . . , vjl} ⊆ N \ {v} in
H , with l ≥ 2. Construct a new graph H2 = (N,EH2), where EH2 , EH1 ∪ {(v, u)} with EH1 as defined in (16).
Arguing as above, the utility of H2 is at least as high as the utility of H , and thus H2 is a BR to G1. Since the
edge (v, u) cannot be in the shortest path between any pair of nodes in N \ {v}, we see that the subgraph of H2
induced by N \ {v} must be a best response to the corresponding subgraph of G1. This proves the result.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS FOR SECTION VI
A. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: When b(1) < c, we use part 3 of Lemma 7. Following the same argument as in Example 3 for trees,
we have α = 0 for G1. Thus the unique BR network to a forest is the empty network when b(1) < c.
For b(1)− b(2) > c, the unique best response to any network is the same network by the first part of Lemma 7.
For b(1)− b(2) ≤ c ≤ b(1), note that G1 is a 2-spanner forest of itself, and thus G1 is a BR to itself by Lemma 3,
proving the second statement. Since this BR has a utility of zero when b(1) = c, the empty network is also a BR
for this value of c, proving the third statement.
Finally, we prove the uniqueness of the BR when b(1) > max{b(2), c}. If G1 has r connected components, then
|E1| = |N | − r. By Lemma 2, we must have |E2| ≥ |N | − r. By Lemma 1, we know that |E2| ≤ |E1| = |N | − r.
Thus |E2| = |E1| and since b(1) > b(2), we have G2 = G1.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: The first statement is a direct result of Lemma 7.
In order to prove the second statement we use Lemma 3. Let Gs be the star network centered at node v. Since
Gs is a 2-spanner tree of G1, it is a BR to G1.
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Next, we prove the third statement. Define Gs as the star network centered at node v. By equation (2), we have
u(Gs|G1) = (|N | − 1)(b(1) − c) + (|E1| − (|N | − 1))b(2). (17)
Now assume that G2 = (N,E2) is a BR network. Using the same argument as in equation (5), we have
u(G2|G1) ≤ |E2|(b(1) − c) + (|E1| − |E2|)b(2). (18)
Using equations (17) and (18) we obtain
u(Gs|G1)− u(G2|G1) ≥ (|E2| − (|N | − 1))(b(2) − b(1) + c). (19)
According to the assumption of the Proposition, c − b(1) ≥ 0 and thus the right hand side of equation (19) is
nonnegative for all |E2| ≥ |N |−1. Therefore, the utility of Gs with respect to G1 is as high as any other connected
network.
Thus assume that G2 is a non-empty disconnected network. Suppose that it has γ components G2k = (Nk, E2k)
for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , γ}. Denote by G1k = (Nk, E1k), k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , γ}, the subgraphs induced by Nk on G1.
Without loss of generality, let v ∈ N1. Then, since G11 contains a star subgraph (centered on v), and G21 is a BR
to G11 (by Lemma 5) and connected, we can take it to be a star by the above argument. Next, we aim to show
that there exists a BR (constructed based on G2) such that all of the components are isolated nodes except G21.
Suppose that some component of G2 (not containing v) has more than one node and take this component to be
G22 without loss of generality. We know that G22 is a BR to G12 based on Lemma 5. Arguing as in equation (5),
we have
u(G22|G12) ≤ |E22|(b(1) − c) + (|E12| − |E22|)b(2). (20)
If G22 has zero utility, we can replace it by the empty network and subsequently, we have the result. Thus assume
by way of contradiction that it has some positive utility. Therefore, the right hand side of equation (20) is positive.
Since G22 is a connected network, |E22| ≥ |N2| − 1. Hence
|E12| − |E22|
|E22|
≤
|E12| − (|N2| − 1)
|N2| − 1
≤
(
|N2|
2
)
− (|N2| − 1)
|N2| − 1
< |N2| − 1. (21)
Using the assumption that the right hand side of inequality (20) is positive and by inequality (21), we have that
0 < |E22|(b(1) − c) + (|E12| − |E22|)b(2)
= |E22|
(
(b(1) − c) +
|E12| − |E22|
|E22|
b(2)
)
< |E22| (b(1)− c+ (|N2| − 1)b(2)) .
Now consider a graph Gˆ2 obtained by removing all edges of G22 and connecting all of its nodes to node v. Since
b(1)− c+ (|N2| − 1)b(2) > 0 we have,
u(Gˆ2|G1) ≥
∑
i 6=2
u(G2i|G1i) + |N2|(b(1) − c) + |E12|b(2)
>
∑
i 6=2
u(G2i|G1i) + |N2|(b(1) − c) + |E12|b(2) − (b(1)− c+ (|N2| − 1)b(2))
=
∑
i 6=2
u(G2i|G1i) + (|N2| − 1)(b(1) − c) + (|E12| − (|N2| − 1))b(2), (22)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that the induced subgraph of N1∪N2 on Gˆ2 is a connected network
and we neglect the benefit (if any) from indirect connections between nodes in N1 \ {v} and N2. The second term
in the first inequality captures the direct benefits and costs of the |N2| edges from nodes in N2 to v, and the third
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term captures the benefits due to each pair of nodes in N2 having a distance of 2 from each other in Gˆ2 (via v).
Next, note that
u(G22|G12) ≤ |E22|(b(1) − c) + (|E12| − |E22|)b(2)
= (|N2| − 1)(b(1) − c) + (|E22| − (|N2| − 1))(b(1) − c) + (|E12| − |E22|)b(2)
≤ (|N2| − 1)(b(1) − c) + (|E22| − (|N2| − 1))b(2) + (|E12| − |E22|)b(2)
= (|N2| − 1)(b(1) − c) + (|E12| − (|N2| − 1))b(2). (23)
Substituting inequality (23) in inequality (22), we have that
u(Gˆ2|G1) >
∑
i 6=2
u(G2i|G1i) + (|N2| − 1)(b(1) − c) + (|E12| − (|N2| − 1))b(2)
≥
∑
i 6=2
u(G2i|G1i) + u(G22|G12) = u(G2|G1).
However this is a contradiction to the assumption that G2 is a BR to G1. Thus all of the nonempty components of
G2 (except G21) must have zero utility and therefore, we can replace each of them by the empty network.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
To prove Proposition 5, we will first need the following intermediate result.
Lemma 9: Let b(1) < c. Consider network G = (N,E) with components Gi = (Ni, Ei) for 1 ≤ i ≤ r
(N = ∪ri=1Ni and E = ∪ri=1Ei). Assume that every induced subgraph of G has a 2-spanner forest. Then every
BR of network G is composed of a BR to each component of G.
Proof: Let F = (∪ri=1Ni, EF ) be a BR to G. Suppose by way of contradiction that F contains a non-empty
component F1 = (W,R) with nodes from p different Ni where p ≥ 2. Let GF1 = (W,EF1) denote the induced
subgraph of W on G and T be a 2-spanner forest of GF1 . The spanner forest T has q components where q ≥ p.
Also note that |R| ≥ |W | − 1 > |W | − q. Then we have
u(F1|GF1) ≤ |R|(b(1) − c) + (|EF1 | − |R|)b(2) (24)
= (|R| − (|W | − q))(b(1) − c) + (|W | − q)(b(1) − c) + (|EF1 | − |R|)b(2)
< (|R| − (|W | − q))b(2) + (|W | − q)(b(1) − c) + (|EF1 | − |R|)b(2)
= (|W | − q)(b(1) − c) + (|EF1 | − (|W | − q))b(2)
= u(T |GF1),
where the first inequality comes from the fact that at most |R| pairs of nodes that are neighbors in GF1 have direct
connections in F1 and the remaining pairs of nodes are at a distance of at least 2 in F1. The second inequality is
due to b(1)− c < b(2).
Inequality (24) means that by replacing F1 with T , we can increase the utility of network F which is a
contradiction to the assumption that F is a BR to G. Therefore, no component of F contains nodes from multiple
components in G and thus by Lemma 6, the subgraph of F induced by Ni must be a BR to Gi for 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
yielding the result.
We are now in place to prove Proposition 5.
Proof: (Proposition 5)
Consider player Pj where 1 ≤ j ≤ m. If j > i1 (i.e., Pj ∈ H0), then G =∼ ∪mt=1,t6=jGt consists of disjoint
complete graphs on node sets Vr, Vr−1, . . . , V0. Since
kj ≥ ki1+1 > n− i1
kj ≥ ki2+1 > i1 − i2
.
.
.
kj ≥ kir+1 > ir−1 − ir
kj ≥ k1 > ir,
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a best response of player Pj to any of these complete networks is the empty network (by Proposition 1 or Lemma 7).
Every induced subgraph of G has a star network on its non-empty components (which means it has a 2-spanner
forest). Thus using Lemma 9, the empty network Gj is a BR to the network of the other players.
Next, we prove that for player Pj ∈ Hl where 1 ≤ l ≤ r − 1, the network Gj is a BR to the other players’
networks. From the definition of the sets Hl in (13), we have that il+1 < j ≤ il. Note that G =∼ ∪mt=1,t6=jGt,
consists of disjoint complete graphs on node sets Vl+1, . . . , Vr. It also has a component C = (∪lt=0Vt, EC) of size
n− il+1. The structure of the network C can be described as a set of complete networks of size n− i1 + 1, i1 −
i2 + 1, . . . , il−1 − il + 1, il − il+1 where all of them have the common node vj . These complete networks are on
node sets V0 ∪ {vj}, V1 ∪ {vj}, . . . , Vl−1 ∪ {vj}, Vl. Network G satisfies the condition of Lemma 9 and thus a BR
to G can be obtained by finding a BR network to each component. Since
kj ≥ kil+2+1 > il+1 − il+2
.
.
.
kj ≥ kir+1 > ir−1 − ir
kj ≥ k1 > ir,
the best response of player Pj to each of the complete networks on node sets Vl+1, . . . , Vr in G is the empty
network.
Network C has a star subgraph centered at node vj and hence by Proposition 3, there exists a BR network
S = (∪lt=0Vt, ES) that is a star network centered at node vj with potentially some isolated nodes. Now assume
that in the network S, there are edges from vj to a nonempty strict subset of nodes Rq ⊂ Vq for some 0 ≤ q ≤ l,
and the set of nodes in Vq \ Rq are isolated. Note that edges between node vj and the set of nodes Rq are only
useful for connections between nodes in Rq ∪ {vj} and produces a utility of
|Rq|
(
bj(1) − cj +
|Rq| − 1
2
bj(2)
)
≥ 0, (25)
where the inequality follows from the fact that this graph has utility at least as large as that of the empty network.
Now construct a new network S′ = (∪lt=0Vt, ES′) by connecting a node u ∈ Vq\Rq to vj , i.e., ES′ = ES∪{(vj , u)}.
Then we have that u(S′|C)− u(S|C) = bj(1)− cj + |Rq|bj(2) which must be a positive value by inequality (25).
This contradicts the assumption that S is a BR to C . Therefore, for each 0 ≤ t ≤ l, node vj is either connected to
all of the nodes in Vt or to none of them. Since
kj ≤ ki1 ≤ n− i1 + 1
kj ≤ ki2 ≤ i1 − i2 + 1
.
.
.
kj ≤ kil ≤ il−1 − il + 1,
a BR to all of the complete networks on nodes Vt ∪ {vj} in C is the star network for 0 ≤ t ≤ l − 1. However,
since kj ≥ kil+1+1 > il − il+1, the BR to the complete network on the set of nodes Vl is the empty network and
thus all of the nodes in Vl \ {vj} must be isolated nodes.
Therefore, we can conclude that a star network centered on the node vj with peripheral nodes {vil+1, . . . , vn} =
∪l−1t=0Vt, and all other nodes being isolated is a BR to the network of the other players; this is precisely the network
Gj given in the statement of the proposition.
Finally, we have to show that players Pj , 1 ≤ j ≤ ir (i.e., Pj ∈ Hr) are in Nash equilibrium. Similar to the above,
for player Pj , G =∼ ∪mt=1,t6=jGt consists of complete networks of size n− i1 +1, i1 − i2 +1, . . . , ir−1− ir +1, ir
with the common node vj . These complete networks are on node sets V0 ∪ {vj}, V1 ∪ {vj}, . . . , Vr−1 ∪ {vj}, Vr .
By an argument similar to the above, since kj ≥ k1 > ir and
kj ≤ ki1 ≤ n− i1 + 1
kj ≤ ki2 ≤ i1 − i2 + 1
.
.
.
kj ≤ kir ≤ ir−1 − ir + 1,
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a star network centered on vj with peripheral nodes {vir+1, . . . , vn} = ∪r−1t=0Vt (i.e., Gj) is a BR to the network of
the other players.
Therefore, for each player Pj ∈ P , Gj is a BR to G =∼ ∪mt=1,t6=jGt and thus the given networks are in Nash
equilibrium.
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